This paper examines changes in wage differentials by educational attainment and experience in the US. and Japan since the early l970s. While educational earnings differentials have expanded dramatically in the U.S. in the 1980s, the college wage premium has increased only slightly in Japan. In contrast to the large expansion in experience differentials for high school males in the U.S., the wages of male new entrants have risen relative to nore experienced workers for both high school and college graduates in Japan from 1979 to 1987. Macroeconomic factors (increased openness, trade deficits, and labor market slack) and changes in institutional structures (the decline in unionization) are likely to have amplified each other in contributing to an unprecedented decline in real and relative earnings of young less-skilledmales in the U.S. in the l98Os, We further find that a sharp deceleration in the rate of growth of college graduates as a fraction of the labor force in the U.S. helps account for the much larger increase in the college wage premium in the U.S. than in Japan in the l980s.
The dramatic deterioration in the absolute and relative economic positions of less-educated Americana in the l980s has generatad much attention among academics, the press, policymakers. and politicians.
Arguments over whether these changes were caused by the Carter administration, the Reagan administration, or "foreign villains" were among the "highlights" of the "good jobs, bad jobs" debate in the 1988 U.S.
Presidential election.
Many of the proposed explanations for the widening of skill differentials in the U.S. have focused on international economic developments. Some have 1Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1989) document that occupational earnings differentials have also expanded tremendously in the U.S. since the late 197Cc. Handlers, service workers, and factory operatives have lost substantial ground relative to managers, professionals, and technical workers over the last decade, argued that the strong dollar of the early 1980s and tha associated large trade deficit and Ildeindustrializationu of America have sharply reduced the demand for less-educated workers as the manufacturing sector that intensively employs these workers has declined.2
Others posit that the increased integration of the world economy has sharply reduced the demand for lesseducated workers through an effective increase in the supply of unskilled workers embodied in imports from newly industrializing nations and from the increased ability of capital to move to where less-skilled labor is cheap (Bluestone and Harrison, 1988) .
A third view is that technological changes (e.g. the microcomputer revolution) that favor intellectual over physical attributes of workers have raised the return to working with the mind rather than the hands.
Distinguishing between these hypotheses is important. In all likelihood, the Us trade deficit will decline sharply in the 1990s if only because foreigners will stop lending to the United States, and as a result the manufacturing sector which has traditionally accounted for a lion's share of American trade will almost certainly grow rapidly. if it is these macroeconomic developments that account for the changing wage structure, recent trends are likely to be reversed without policy interventions. On the other hand, if recent changes in the earnings distribution are a consequence of either a secular increase in the openness of the wand economy or of.
technological innovations favoring highly skilled workers, these changes are likely to persist. In this case, the importance of formulating policies that raise the skilled fraction of the labor force is increased.
American time series information alone is likely to prove insufficient 2xurphy and Welch (1988s,b) provide suggestive evidence for this view.
to distinguish between various explanations for changing skill differentials.
This paper brings to bear information on changes in the Japanese wage structure in sn effort to illuminate the causes of changing wage structures.3
While broad technological developments may be quite similar in Japan and the United States, the two countries are mirror images in terms of their trade performance during the 1980s.
In this paper, we first set out the basic facts of how wage differentials by educational attainment and experience have changed in the U.S. and Japan since the early 1970a. While both countrieá exhibit a decline in the relative earnings of college graduates and moderate increases in wage differentials by experience in the l970s, we find that the two countries differ sharply with reapect to changes in the structure of wages in the 1980s. In contrast to the sharp expansion of educational earnings differentials in the U.S. in the l980s, the college wage premium has increased only slightly in Japan. In contrast to the large expansion in experience differentials for high school males in the U.S. the wages of male naw entrants have risen relative to more experienced workers for both high school and college graduates in Japan from 1979 to 1987. Furthermore, real wages increased moderately for new entrants at all levels of schooling in Japan in the l980s.
The shsrp difference between the U.S. and Japan in the change in the economic performsnce of young, high-school males is suggestive of an 3This paper differs from other recent literature on changes in the wage structure in the 1980s in that it compares hQ.fJi changes between two countries snd across time periods (the l970s vs. the 1980s) .
important role for macroeconomic factors associsted with trade performance and the health of the manufacturing sector in shaping changea in the distribution of earnings. If broad global changes, such as increased international economic integration or technological changes, are the key elements in affecting recent labor market developments, then the differences in the U.S. snd Japanese experiences suggest that differences in labor market institutions (e.g. the role and strength of unions, training institutions minimum wages) are crucial in determining how these factors translate into changes in the wage structure.
We present a collage of evidence designed to help make a preliminary assessment of these interpretations of changes in the wage structure as well as to determine the importance of demographic factors (changes in the relative number of workers by education and age). Our broad conclusion is that there is no monocausal explanation for recent changes in wage structure.
There are elements of truth in each of several proposed hypotheses.
More specifically, we find that:
I. The rate of growth of college graduates as a fraction of the labor force decreased dramatically in the U.S. and did not decrease as much in Japan in the l9BOs. This sharp deceleration in the U.S. helps account for the much larger increase in the college wage premium in the U.S. than in Japan in the 1980s. Relative supply factors do not appear to be able to account for the sharp decline in the earnings of young less-educated Americans relative to the more experienced workers with similar educational attainment.
2. Macroeconomic factors (increased openess, trade deficits, and labor market slack) and changes in institutional structures (the decline in The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents in detail the quantitative dimenaiona of changes in wage differentials by educational attainment and by experience in the United Statea and Japan. Section III considers the role of demographic factors.
macroeconomic conditions, structural demand shifts, and deunionization in explaining movements in the structure of wages. Section IV concludes.
II. Chanzes in the Structure of Wages in the U.S. and Javan
In this section, we lay out the basic facts concerning recent changes in the structure of wages in the U.S. and Japan. We first present a brief comparative overview of changes in educational wage differentials and then turn to detailed examinations of movements in the pattern of earnings in each country. Figure 1 presents the time pattern of changes in the college wage premium in both countries. It compares changes in the ratio of the income of 25-34 year old male college gradustes to those of similarly aged male high school graduates for the U.S. and Japan from 1967 to l9S7. The figure illustrates that the college wage premium has been substantially higher in the U.S. than in Japan throughout the last twenty years. It further shows 4For the U.S., we the median annual money income of full-time, yearround workers. For Japan, we use average monthly wages (total monthly contractual earnings plus one-twelfth of annual special payments). College graduates are those with 4 or more years of college, and high school graduates are those with 12 years of schooling. I 1967 I 1969 I 1971 I 1973 I 1975 I 1977 I 1979 I 1961 I 1983 I 1985 I 1967 (1981) documents that a similar pattern of the deterioration in the relative earnings of highly-educated workers occurred in almost all OECD economies during the 1970s.
6A potentially important problem with earnings data froa the CPS outgoing rotation groups is that the edited usual weekly earnings variable is top coded at $999. This top code is relevant for a substantial fraction of highly educated males in recent yests. We conclude from a detailed analysis of alternative treatments of the top code that a reasonable approximation is to recode the weekly earnings of those at the cap as $1450. This adjustment yields results for changes in reel end relative earnings of different groups of workers in the 1979 to 1987 period that are similar to those found when one compares changes in group median earnings and when one uses a tobit procedure (that explicitly treats the observations with top coded earnings ss censored) to estimate mean earnings for each group. who satisfied the following conditions: (1) listed working as major activity; (2) were not self-employed; and (3) had usual hourly earnings (usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours) of at least one-half the prevailing minimum wage and less than or equal to $50 an hour.7
We first provide a summary of changes in the structure of earnings in the U.S. since 1973 for young workers (those with less then 10 years of potential experience) and for peak earners (those with 20 to 29 years of potential experience).8
We focus on 12 separate groups for each year: three educational splits (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 12 , and 16+ years of schooling), 2 potential experience splits (0-9 and 20-29 years), and 2 gender groups. For each of the 12 separate groups in 1973, 1979, and 1987 , we regress the log of usual hourly earnings on potential experience, dummy variables for years of schooling (where appropriate), and dummy variables for nonwhite, part-time, and metropolitan area status. The resulting estimated mean log wage rates and their estimated standard errors are reported in the top panel of Table   The estimates are predicted values from the regressions for white1 fulltiae, workers, residing in a metropolitan ares at three educational levels (8) (9) (10) (11) 12 , and 16 years) and two experience levels (5 and 25 years). These adjusted means of log hourly earnings for each group allow us to control for changes in observed measures of group composition in making inferences 7Our basic samples contain the following numbers of observations: 34,806 for 1973; 148,683 for 1979; 155,172 for 1984; and 158,466 for 1987. 8We define potential experience as min(Age -education -6, age -18). Table 2 are reported in 1987 dollars. We deflated converted earnings from 1973 and 1979 into 1981 dollars using the personal consumption expenditures implicit price deflator for GNP. Bound and Johnson (1989) in an examination of changes in relative wages over the 1979-87 period. 1These summary changes are based on separate log hourly earnings regressions for our entire aamples of 18 to 65 year males and females respectively for 1973, 1979, and 1987 . The regressions included 8 schooling dummies, a spline in potential experience, 8 region dummies, a race dummy, a metropolitan area status dummy, and a part-time work dummy. The estimated college/high school log hourly wage differential for males (females) declined from 0. 32 (0.39) in 1973 to 0.27 (0.30) These increases in experience differentials for high school graduates occurred despite a decline in the fraction of high school graduates with 1-3 years of experience (Murphy and Welch, l988b) . This suggests that theae changes reflect a relative demand shift against young, less-educated workers rather than the impact of generational crowding. The increases in experience differentials for less-educated workers reflected the tremendous real earnings losses of young, less-educated workers rather than real earnings growth for peak earners. In contrast, the relative earnings of peak earners to new entrants for both male and female college graduates have remained fairly stable since 1979.
9All earnings figures in
Finally, while gender differentials are not a focus of the current study, it is of interest to note that between 1979 and 1987 male/female earnings differential narrowed substantially (from 4 to 10 percent) between 1979 and 1987 for every education-experience category represented in the Table 1 . This contrasts with the small amount of change in gender differentials apparent in the 1973-79 period. 125ee Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1989) and Murphy and Welch (l988a) for a more detailed analysis of changes in relative earnings over time for different age and experience cohorts. The numbers in panel A are the ratios of the average usual weekly earnings for college graduates (4 or more years of college) relative to the corresponding average for high school graduates (12 yeara of schooling) within an experience group. The numbers in panel B are the ratios of the average usual weekly earnings of experienced workers relative to the corresponding average for those of new entrants within a schooling group. Experience is defined as min(Age -18, age -years of schooling -6).
Source: Authora' calculations using the May 1973 Current Population Survey and the Full-Year 1979 , 1984 Current Population Surveys (Outgoing Rotation Groups).
Panel B of Table 2 shows that earnings of less-educated male new entrants fell dramatically relative to both peak earners end workers with 10-14 years of experience from 1979 to 1987. The ratios also indicate that less-educated peak earners gained substantially relative to males with the ssme educational attainment and 10-14 years of experience in the 1980s. These figures are for full-time workers and are based on a data from March CPSs. Similar increases in inequality are apparent within almost all education-experience-gender groups. More detailed analyses of within group changes in inequality and descriptions of this data set can be found in Juhn, Murphy, and Fierce (1989) and Katz and Murphy (1989) . differential between the ninetieth and tenth percentile worker in a group) has increased rather steadily throughout the period since the early 1970s after remaining fairly stable itt the 1960s (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1989) .
The time pattern of increases in within group inequality suggests that changes in the structure of the U.S. economy mitigating in favor of increased returns to "ability" (or maybe to luck and connections) have operated sinca the early 1970s. The different time pattern of changes in educational wage differentials suggests that tha rapid increase in the supply of college graduates in the early to mid-l970s may have offset factors tending towards increased skill differentials.
B. Chanees in the Structure of Wages in Jaosn
This section documents changes in relative wages by education and experience in Japan since the late 1960s. We concentrate exclusively on changes in earnings differentials for males because of data availability and the strong segmentation between males and females in the Japanese labor market.
In contrast to the U.S. experience of the l9SOs, educational wage differentials have increased only moderately in Japan since the late 1910s, and experience differentials for both high school and college males have Figure 2 are for regular workers in private establishments with 10 or more regular workers. 15Nakota and Mosk (1987) report that university enrollment rates for males in Japan increased from 10.5 percent in 1950 to 45.9 percent in 1980. See Umetani (1973) for a study of the impact of the rapid expansion of the college-educated labor force from the l950s to the early l970s on the relative earnings of college graduates.
an improvement in future career prospe-cts for college graduates relative to high school graduates in the 1980s that might not show up in wages for several years.
For our more detailed analysis of wage .differentials in Japan we use data from the published tables for private industries of the Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa (Basic Survey on Wage Structure) These wage data are compiled from surveys of individuals in about 70,000 non-government establishments with ten or more regular workers taken in June of each year
These wage statistics provide us with data on mean wages for male regular workers in reasonably detailed age-educational attainment categories. In our analysis of wage differentials, we use a reasonably comprehensive measure of total monthly earnings: the sum of total monthly contract earnings (regular earnings plus overtime payments) and one-twelfth of annual special earnings (bonus payments).
--. -Changes in reel monthly wages for male regular workers in selected educational attainment-experience groups from 1974-9 and 1979-87 are presented in Table 3 . The pattern of real wage changes contrast sharply with the pattern in the United States. In particular, less-educated male new entrants have experienced more robust real earnings growth in the 1980s than in the 1974-9 period. Less-educated male new entrants have gained ground against workers with about 10 years of labor market experience in the 1980s.
L6These data have been compiled and maintained by the Ministry of Labour on an annual basis since 1954. The survey design is described in detail in Japan Ministry of Labour (1986, pp. 306-9) . survey excludes the agriculture, fishing and forestry sector, In addition, the all-industry aggregates that we use exclude employees of public enterprises. Separate industry data does-include employees of public enterprises in transportation, communications, and public utilities-. b New entrants are workers from 15 to 17 years old for lower secondary graduates (9 years of schooling), workers from 18 to 20 years old for high school graduates (12 years of schooling), and workers from 20 to 24 years old for college graduates (16+ years of schooling).
c Young experienced workers are workers from 20 to 24 years old for lower secondary graduates, workers from 25 to 29 years old for high school graduates, and workers from 30 to 34 years old for college graduates.
Source: Basic Survey on Wage Structure, tables for regular workers in establishments with 10 or more regular workers in privste enterprises.
In contrast to the depressed market for inexperienced high school males in the U.S, the changes illustrated in Table 3 Tables 2 end 4 shows that, in 1979, the college/high school wage differential was larger for young males in the U.S. but quite similar for peak earners (those with 20 to 30 years of experience) in the two countries. This difference reflects a greater disparity in the steepness of the age-earnings profile for college versus high school workers in Japan.
The comparison of college and high school workers of the same age reveals that the college wage premium in Japan has increased substantially since 1979 for young workers. Yet within experience groups, the increase in The amaller increases in the college wage premium for experience groups than for age groups in Japan is the exact opposite of the pattern in the 
III. Causes of Chanaes in the Structure of Wages
In this section, we provide an exploratory investigation of four potentislly complementary hypotheses for recent changes in the structure of wages in the U.S. and Japan: changes in relative numbers of workers by age and education; trade performance and mecroeconomic conditions; broader Peak earners are defined as workers from 45 to 49 years old. New entrants are workers from 15 to 17 years old for lower secondary graduates, workers from 18 to 20 years old for high school graduates, end workers from 20 to 24 years old for college graduates.
b Young workers are workers from 20 to 24 years old for lower secondary graduates, workers from 25 to 29 years old for high school graduates, and workers from 30 to 34 years old for college graduates. 
$imvlv Factors
A first factor that many labor economists have focused on to explain changes in the relative wages by age and education are changes in the demographic structure of the labor force. The assumption of imperfect substitutability between younger and older workers and between more-and less-educated workers implies that changes in the age atructure and educational attainment of the population and are likely to affect the structure of wages. The degree of impact of relative numbers on the relative earnings of two groups (in a simple two factor world) depends inversely on the elasticity of factor substitution between the two groupsJ8
Changes jn the Relative Supply of Coflete A stark version of the relative supply hypothesis for educational differentials makes the simplifying assumption that the relative demand for college graduates grows at a relatively stable trend rate (perhaps becuase of steady technological chagnes favoring more skilled workers). This hypothesis 18When both factors are paid their marginal products, the elasticity of substitution (a) between two factors can be written as -dlnRE/dlnRW, where RE measures relative input quantities (employment) and RW measures relative input prices (wages). Relative input demand can then be written:
where DEM is an index of properly measured demand shifts. Under market clearing, RE equals relative supply (RSUP). This yields a wage determination equation of the form
In RW --1/a ln(RSUP) + 1/a ln(DEM).
suggests that differences in the rate of change of the college wage premium between two periods should be negatively related to differences in the rate of growth of college graduates as a share of the labor force. Table 6 provides summary information on changes in the fraction of the labor force with college degrees in the U.S. and Japan since the early 1970s.
The table indicates that the rats of growth of college graduates as a fraction of the labor force was considerably slower in the U.S. in the 1979-87 period than in the 1973-79 period. In fact, the fraction of males aged 25-34 with college degrees declined from 1979 to 1987. The period of peak growth for college graduates as a fraction of the U.S. workforce corresponds with a period of a declining college wage premium, and the more recent period of slow growth corresponds to a sharply increasing premium.
The combination of a steady increase in the relative demand for college graduates (perhaps from technical change and shifts in product market demands related to increasing openness) and a deceleration in the growth rate of college graduates goes some distance towards explaining increased educational differentials in the U.5 in the 1980s. The annual rate of growth of college graduates ss a fraction of the male labor force declined by approximately 2 percent from 1973-9 to 1979-87. while the annual rate of growth of the college/high school wage differential for males aged 18-65 increased by 2.5 percent from -0.8 percent in the earlier period to 1.7 percent in the later period.19 If the elasticity of substitution between college males and other male labor is in Freeman's (1978) preferred range of I to 3, then the observed slowdown in the rate of growth of college graduates could explain an 19These growth rates follow from s decline im the college/high school wage differential for all males of 5 percent from 1973-9 and an incresse in the differential of 14 percent from 1979-87, increase in the rate of growth of the college wage premium of 0.67 to 2 percent a year. 
Cohort Size Effects
Changes in the relative size of entering cohorts of male high school and of male college graduates between 1967 and 1987 for both the U.S. and Japan are illustrated in Figure 420 The figure shows that while the fraction of new entrants among high school graduates in the U.S. increased steadily throughout the l9lOs, this fraction has declined sharply in the 1980s.
Thus, for the U.S., the wages of young high school graduates fell dramatically relative to those of more experienced high school graduates in exactly the period in which it would appear that the negative impact 20The U.S. plots present the share of new entrants in total annual manhours rather than the employment share of new entrants in terms of bodies since we do not have actual employment share for the entire 1967-87 period. The patterns of changes in the share of hours and of employment of new entrants is virtually identical in the years for which we have both. (!4osk and Nakota, 1985) . More experienced workers were less affected by this slowdown since they were insulated by internal labor markets. The share of less-educated workers in U.S. manufacturing fell dramatically in the l980s. Less-educated workers were who in previous generations gained high-wage manufacturing sector were instead ending up in the low-wage retail trade sector. Shifts of similar magnitude are not apparent in the 1973-9
period. In contrast to the U.S. experience, panel (c) of Table 7 shows that young Japanese high school males have shifted dramatically into the durables sector (metals and machinery) and have moved out of (wholesale and retail) trade during the 1980a. Japanese high school male new entrants did well during the period of expanded new hiring in durablas in the 1980s and did poorly during the period of declining manufacturing employment from 1974-9.
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4soperience equala mi044ge -yru of schooling 6, Age -18). For the U.S. in the 1980s, the substantial improvement in earnings of women and of college graduates relative to male dropouts and high school workers further suggests thet shifts in product demand away from heavy industries, which intensively employ less-educated males, end towards service industries, which tend to employ high school and college females and male college graduates, msy be an important factor in changing relative wages.
The data (in Tables 1 and 7 ) suggest a strong negative correlation (p -0.92) between the frsction employed in durables at the start of the decade and the wage performance for the different groups of young workers in the 1980s. Overall, the U.S. and Japanese experiences indicate that the availsbility of employment opportunities in manufacturing for those without college degrees has tended to be e strong indicator of the relative performance of less-educated young workers. Table 7 also illustrates that despite the overall sharp decline in employment in durables in the 1980s, the share of young college-educated workers employed in durables actually increased from 1979 to 1987. This suggests the possibility of changes in production techniques that has further shifted demand against the unskilled in a period during which many believe the skills of new Americsn high school graduates have been deteriorating (e.g. Murnane, 1988) . A "mismatch" between the skills demanded by employers and skills provided by young less-educated Americans may further exacerbate their labor market difficulties. The greater incentives for the attainment of cognitive skills by thoae not planning to attend college in Japanese than in American high schools suggests that Japanese high school graduates may be better prepared to deal with recent technological innovations emphasizing worker flexibility than are recent American high school greduates (Bishop, 1987) . Furthermore, differences in employment and training practices in the U.S. and Japan, such as the "white collarization" of (largely high-school educated) production workers in Japan described by Koike (1988) , suggest that similar shifts in production techniques may have quite different impacts on educational wage differentials in the U.S. and Japan. In particular, the greater importance of on-the-job skill enhancement in Japan may also make high school educated workers more adaptable to these changes. It is possible that the substitutability of high school and college workers is greater in Japan than in the United Ststes so that educational differentials may be less responsive to market shifts in Japan.
When the composition of product demand shifts perhaps because of changes in international competition, it is likely that labor demand will increase in the sectors where product demand has increased. Shifts in product demand are likely to raise the relative demand for the labor of the demographic groups aost concentrated in the production of the goods or services in industries where demand has increased. Murphy and Welch (l988b) find that product demand shifts associated with the sharp increase in U.S. net imports in the 1980s hawe shifted labor demand against males with 12 or fewer years of schooling and against female high school drop outs. Katz and Murphy (1989) find that overall shifts in the industrial distribution of employment in the U.S. have worked against less-educated males and in favor of college graduates in the 1980s although a similar pattern is apparent starting in the early l970s. This pattern of demand shifts suggests that structural factors such as increased openness and technological change have operated in favor of more skilled and educated workers since the early 1970s. The rapid supply expansion of college graduates nullified the impact of these changes on the college wage premium during the 1970s. On the other hand, these demand shifts showed up in the l97Os through increases in inequality within educational groups. The slowdown in the growth of college graduates, the impact of trade, and the continuation of these trend shifts in demand all operated towards increased skill and educational differentials in the l9BOs.
Changes Between and Within Industries
The large variation across industries in wages for workers with the ssme observed characteristics suggests that shifts in the industrial composition of employment, whether caused by product demand shifts or changes in production tethnologiea, msy help explain changes in the wage structure by affecting the average industry wage premium earned by different groups. A large body of evidence suggests that a substantial part of these interindustry wage differentials reflect "rents."22 For the U.S. in the lQBOa, the shift of low-educated males from isenufacturing jobs with large wage premiums to lowwsge jobs in retail trade and repair services combined with the shift of college graduates out of low-wage education and welfare services and into the more lucrative jobs in professional servicea could play a role in explaining the increased college wage premium in the l9BOa.
To examine the industry rents hypothesis, we compare changes in the college/high school wage differential estimated in log hourly earnings equations with and without detailed industry dummies. The results of this procedure for our U.S. samples are presented in Table B . Large increases in the college/high school differential remain even when industry dummies are 22See Katz and Summers (1989) for a recent review of the evidence on the extent to which inter-industry wage differentials for workers with the same observable chatacteristica represent noncompetitive wage differentials (rentaL A final macroeconomic factor affecting the wage structure is the degree of labor market tightness. A considereble body of evidence suggests that tight labor markets raise the relative wages of less-educated, less-skilled, and young workers (e.g. Murphy and Welch, 1988a; and Freeman, 1988) . The 
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These figures are based on calculations using our samples from the Full Year 1979 and 1987 CPSs. Earnings figures were deflated by the national personal consumption expenditures deflator. economy potentially removes many jobs from which less-skilled workera earned union wage premia and also reduces the likely positive impact of the threat of unionization on the earnings of less-skilled nonunion workers. Table 9 presents tabulations from the May 1973 , May 1979 , and Full Year 1987 A first cut approach to analyzing the direct impact of deunionization on the earnings of a group is to examine changes in the estimated rents earned by union members as a share of total compensation of the group. We take the estimated union-nonunion wage differential from a log hourly earnings regression with standard controls, industry dummies, and interactions of union membership with educational attainment as our measure of the union wage premium.25 Since the estimated union-nonunion wage differential increased substantially for males with 12 or fewer years of schooling from 1979 to 1987 (possibly because the lower rent union jobs are the ones that tend to be eliminated by deunionization), deunionizstion is estimated to have reduced the earnings of the lees-educated relative to college graduates by 0.5 to 2.0 percent.26 For example, the estimated union-nonunion In wsge differential 25 Each regression includes 8 dummy variables for years of schooling, a spline in experience, a race dummy, a metropolitan ares dummy, 8 region dummies, a pert-time work dummy, 41 industry dummies, a union membership dummy, end three education class/union status interaction dummies.
26Blsckburn, Bloom, and estimate larger effects of deunionization (in the range of 3 to 5 percent) on the earnings of the unskilled for the entire 1973-87 period under the assumption that the union wage premium remained unchanged at its 1973 level throughout this period. The extent of unionization in Japan has also declined sharply in the 1980s (Freeman and Rebick, 1989) . Since Japanese unions have traditionally included both blue and white collar workers (high school end college workers)
in an enterprise, they are not likely to have been as important a factor in increasing the relative earnings of less-educated workers as U.S. unions have been. This suggests that deunionization is likely to have been a more important force toward increasing educational differentials in the U.S. than in Japan.
D.
Assessing the Alternative Exnlanations: Some time Series Evidencs
We conclude this section with the presentation of some simple time series models designed to give a some quantitative assessment of the importance of relative supply, macroeconomic conditions, and structural factors in explaining recent changes in the wage structure. We eetimate models of the form is an estimate of the elasticity of the response of relative wages to the relative numbers of workers in a group, wi is a measure of the wage for group i, N1 is a measure of the supply of workers in group 1, and cycle is measure of labor market tightness.27 We examine models for college/high school wage ratios and for the ratio of the earnings of high school new entrants to those of experienced high school workers. These models provide a crude approach to gauging the importance of changes in demographic factors, trade performance, labor market tightness, and trending structural demand shifts on relative wages.
Four estimated models of the form of equation (1) are presented in Table   10 . The first line of the table examines movements in the college/high school income ratio for U.S. males aged 25-34 from 1967-87(presented in Figure 1 ). The estimates indicate that all four factors have significant impacts in the expected direction on the college wage premium. The estimated supply elasticity of -0.35 suggests an elasticity of substitution between young prime aged college and high school graduates of approximately 3.
Increases in net exports as a share of ON? improve and increases in the prime age male unemployment rate reduce the relative earnings of high school 27For the U.S., we follow Murphy and Welch (l988a) in using the innovations in the prime age male unemployment rate as our measure of labor market cyclical conditions. We use the job vacancy rate for Japan. See Freeman (1978) for a defense of the usefulness of equations of the form of equation (1). 0967-1987 (miosing 196.8,1973. 1990,1981) 8Por the U.S., the cycle variable le the raaidual froe a regreaaion of the prime age (25-54 year old) unemployment rate on Ita oan lag from 1946-67. For Japan, the cycle oariable ia the vacancy rate (vacant jobo over civilian employment) and the oouroe Is OECE, Rain Economic Indicators, data bane On ORL Variations in the growth rate of the supply of college graduatea combined with a steady trend increase in the demand for college graduates go a long way toward explaining movements in the college wage premium for 25-34 year old males. In contrast, while the estimated model in line 2 of Table 10 for the college/high school new entrants is similar to that in line 1, the movements in relative supply of college and high school new entrants have a different time pattern from those of 25-34 years old. The lahor market entrance of the baby bust cohorts of high school graduates has implied a sharp increase in the ratio of college to high school inexperienced workers in the l9BOs. An alternative interpretation of this perverse prediction is that supply factors do matter for the improved position of young college graduates in the 1980s, but that a measure of supply incorporating a broader range of experience groups is appropriate.
The estimates in line 2 suggest that most of the increase in the college wage differential for new entrants in the l9BOs is related to the adverse impact of the increased trade deficit on young high school new entrants.
This is also the case in line 3 for the sharp increase in the experience wage premium for high school graduates in the 1980s. The net export variable could be picking up a host of other phenomena occurring in the l980s (such as the decline in unionization). Cohort size moves in a perverse direction to explain the deterioration in the position of young less-educated American males in the 1980s. On the other hand, the estimates in line 4 of Table 10 indicate that the reduction in entering cohort size and increase in labor market tightness (as measured by the vacancy rate) in the 1980s have improved the relative position of young high school males relative to experienced workers in Japan.
IV. Conclusions
Although we find no simple explanation for recent changes in the distribution of earnings in the U.S. and Japan, we do find support for some hypotheses. We find that a reduction in the rate of growth of college graduates in the U.S. starting in the late l970s goes a part of the way towards explaining differences in the U.S. and Japanese experiences.
Macroeconomic factors (labor market slack and trade deficits) and changes in institutional structures (the decline in unionization of less-educated workers) appear to have reinforced each other leading to an unprecedented decline in real and relative earnings of young less-skilled males in the U.S.
in the lPBOs.
The role of persistent structurel factors such as increased openness, changes in the international division of labor, and technological changes favoring the more skilled are much more difficult to evaluate. Comparative research examining the experiences of other developed countries is likely to be a fruitful avenue for future research on changes in the structure of wages.
